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Abstract: Epidemic spreading on complex networks depends on the topological structure as well as on the
dynamical properties of the infection itself. Generally speaking, highly connected individuals play the role of hubs
and are crucial to channel information across the network. On the other hand, static topological quantities measuring
the connectivity structure are independent on the dynamical mechanisms of the infection. A natural question is
therefore how to improve the topological analysis by some kind of dynamical information that may be extracted
from the ongoing infection itself. In this spirit, we propose a novel vaccination scheme that exploits information from
the details of the infection pattern at the moment when the vaccination strategy is applied. Numerical simulations
of the infection process show that the proposed immunization strategy is effective and robust on a wide class of
complex networks.
PACS number(s): 89.75.-k, 87.23.Ge, 87.10.Rt
1 Introduction
Epidemic diffusion on complex networks [1–3] is
a general paradigm to describe a large variety of
real world outbreaks of infections, ranging from the
strictly biological case to malware diffusion as well
as opinion propagation [4]. A central issue is the
design of efficient immunization strategies able to
prevent or control the epidemic spreading [2]. In
this context, numerical simulations are a flexible
and well-controlled framework to study epidemic
dynamics. In particular, they allow to understand
the effectiveness of vaccination strategies that we
shall broadly classify as preventive vs. reactive
schemes. Preventive immunization strategies aim
to strengthen the network against epidemics using
information about the healthy configuration, i.e.
identifying the nodes to be immunized according to
some score before the epidemic event. The score
may require local or global knowledge about the
network topological structure. An important ex-
ample of the preventive approach is the Targeted
Immunization scheme (TI) [5] (see also [6–8]), orig-
inally designed for scale-free networks. The idea is
to target nodes with high connectivity degree be-
cause they act as hubs in the infection spreading. A
similar degree-based approach, but exploiting only
local information, is the Acquaintance Immuniza-
tion (AI) [9]. Some variations and improvements
are discussed in [10, 11].
Instead, reactive immunization strategies start
with the network undergoing a propagating infec-
tion and take into account dynamical aspects of the
network and of the epidemic itself to identify which
are the best sites to be vaccinated. Several scores
have been designed considering, for instance, per-
sonal awareness about the epidemics [12], message-
passing interactions [13], dynamical reaction of the
networks [14, 15], information from previous infec-
tions [16], finite time for the vaccination to become
effective [17], etc. A remarkably simple example of
reactive protocols is the so-called High-Risk Immu-
nization (HRI) [18], where the healthy neighbors of
infected nodes are vaccinated.
In this paper, we propose a modification of TI
scheme which exploits a refined score based on a
local-global mixed strategy. Specifically, it intro-
duces a modified score that is designed to consider
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both hubs and individuals at risk of contagion as rel-
evant in the epidemic spreading. In other words, we
attempt to use the infection itself as a source of in-
formation and as a probe of how the network reacts
to the disease. On a regular network the infection
may display a well defined propagating front, then,
a good strategy is to vaccinate in a neighborhood of
it. It is not clear whether this strategy makes sense
on a complex network and we precisely try to an-
swer this question. The effectiveness of our strategy
is tested by a Monte Carlo implementation of the
SIR model [19, 20] on a variety of complex theoret-
ical and real networks and systematically compar-
ing our proposal with some standard immunization
strategies [5, 9, 18].
2 Epidemics modeling and reactive im-
munizations: a new score
The SIR model is a simple compartmental model
of disease spreading [19]. Individuals are divided in
three classes: susceptible (S), infected (I) and re-
covered (R). The epidemic evolution is then mod-
eled by the transitions S → I and I → R. In more
details, it starts with a single (patient zero) infected
node. Then, at each step of the Monte Carlo pro-
cess, a randomly chosen infected individual can re-
cover with probability pSIR. Otherwise, one of its
first neighbors is randomly selected and, if suscepti-
ble, gets infected. The reactive immunization takes
place when a fraction f (the epidemic threshold) of
the population is infected.1 The vaccination is a
single-step process in which a fraction g of suscep-
tibles individuals is immunized according to some
score. The finite size of the network ensures that
1Due to the stochastic nature of the process, epidemic may
die out before reaching the threshold f and immunization
does not take place in these cases. The relation between
the quantities g and 〈dV 〉 is 〈dV 〉 = Pfg, where Pf is the
probability that the infection reaches the threshold (which of
course depends on the network and the threshold itself). We
choose to take into account these events because they give
an information about the exposure of a given network to a
pandemic outbreak without vaccination. Given the value of
pSIR, the non-spreading events are relatively rare, for example
for a BA[2] the probability to reach the lower threshold is
roughly 90%.
the system always reaches a steady final state with-
out infected individuals. The density dR of recov-
ered individuals in this state is clearly related to the
spreading strength of the epidemic on the network.
A good immunization strategy would therefore re-
duce the final density dR at the cost of a relatively
low vaccinated density dV . The average values 〈dR〉
and 〈dV 〉 are computed by repeating the SIR evolu-
tion with vaccination a large number of times.
We propose a novel strategy of vaccination which
interpolates between preventive and reactive immu-
nizations. In doing so, we take into account both
static information (like the network geometry) and
dynamical information (like the pattern of a specific
infection). To this aim, we consider the score
Si = di +
∑
j∈Ni
[
β
δj,I
(dj)1/2
+ γ
δj,S
di
di − dj
di + dj
]
, (2.1)
where Ni denotes the set of neighbors of the i-th
node, di its degree (i.e. the number of links point-
ing to it), δj,I and δj,S are the Kronecker deltas
which select only infected or suspectible neighbors
and β, γ are free parameters. We call our proposal
Locally-Modified Targeted Immunization (LMTIβ,γ).
For β = γ = 0, the score reduces to that of Targeted
Immunization [5]. The β-term in the r.h.s. of (2.1)
favors the immunization of individuals near the epi-
demic front. The damping factor (dj)−1/2 selects
neighbors with lower connectivity, which constitute
bottlenecks for the epidemic diffusion. It is therefore
possible to reduce the contagion by cutting them
off. The γ-term is a further improvement involv-
ing the so-called leverage centrality [21] restricted
to the susceptible neighbors. It measures the recip-
rocal influence of the i-th node and its neighbors in
the epidemic diffusion. In fact, leverage centrality is
a natural metric quantifying the local influence of a
node on its neighbors and therefore it gives comple-
mentary local information with respect to the com-
mon (local) clustering coefficient.
We test the effectiveness of the score (2.1) against
the following benchmark immunization strategies
• Targeted Immunization (TI). Our imple-
mentation of TI follows the original idea: nodes
are vaccinated according to their degree. The
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only modification is that the immunization is
performed as a reactive process when the epi-
demic reaches the threshold f . Only nodes
yet susceptible at the vaccination time are pro-
tected.
• Acquaintance Immunization (AI). As in
the previous case, AC immunization [9] is im-
plemented as a reactive process. The choice of
the nodes to be vaccinated follows the original
proposal. Random first neighbors of randomly
selected nodes are vaccinated (if susceptible)
according to the desired immunized fraction g.
• High Risk Immunization (HRI). Our im-
plementation retains the idea of [18] to vacci-
nate neighbors of infected nodes, but the pro-
cess is instantaneous and permanent. We test
this strategy by immunizing up to the 99% of
the first neighbors of the infected nodes at the
vaccination time.
3 Benchmark complex networks
We test the effectiveness of our protocol on a vari-
ety of networks ranging from theoretical models to a
selection of real networks. In the first class, we con-
sider the classical examples of Barabàsi-Albert (BA)
and Watts-Strogatz (WS) models. The first one is
the prototype of scale-free networks [4, 22] and it is
based on a growth algorithm with preferential at-
tachment. We denote with BA[Q] the network built
adding Q new links at each step of the algorithm.
The second one is the prototype of small-world net-
works [4, 22, 23]. WS graphs are built starting from
regular ones with N nodes (each one connected to
2Q consecutive sites) and then rewiring the links
with probability θ. Here, we consider WS[Q] net-
works with Q = 2, 3 and θ = 0.1, 0.5.
We also propose two modifications of BA model.
The first one is based on a partial randomization
procedure. We start with a standard BA[Q] net-
work with N nodes, then we randomly rewire R
links. In our tests, we consider Q = 2, N = 1000
and R = 100, 500, 1000, 2000. The second variant
is realized starting with m disconnected BA[2] cen-
ters, further connected adding k random links be-
Figure 1. Some examples of randomly connected BA
networks. The first line shows 5 BAs connected with
100 and 500 and 2000 random extra links. In the second
and third line the plots show examples of the networks
obtained starting with 10 and 20 centers.
tween nodes belonging to different BAs. Here, we
consider a starting network with N = 5000 nodes,
equally distributed in m = 5, 10, 20 initial clusters,
and k = 100, 500, 2000. This variant can be thought
as a toy model for the epidemic spreading in clus-
tered communities with relatively loose links. Some
examples of the resulting networks are shown in Fig.
1.
Besides these theoretical models, we also con-
sider the epidemic spreading in the following real
networks:
1. Internet_AS, 11174 nodes, 23408 links. It de-
scribes the undirected unweighted Internet Net-
work2 [24] at the Autonomous System level.
The data were collected by the Oregon Route
Views Project http://www.routeviews.org/
in May 2001. Nodes represent Internet service
providers and edges connections among them.
2. AA, 1057 nodes, 2502 links. It describes the
interactions between the metabolites of E. coli
2https://sites.google.com/site/cxnets/research222
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in the course of the metabolic cycle3 [25]. We
consider the AA case.
3. CA-HepTh-pruned, 8638 nodes, 24836 links.
The Arxiv HEP-TH (High Energy Physics -
Theory) collaboration network4 from the e-
print arXiv. A paper generates a completely
connected subgraph in which nodes represent
its authors.
4. p2p-Gnutella08, 6300 nodes, 20776 links. It is a
sequence of snapshots of the Gnutella peer-to-
peer file sharing network from August 2002.5
Nodes represent hosts in the Gnutella network
and edges are connections among them.
5. ProteinYeast, 1870 nodes, 2350 links. It is the
Protein Interaction Network6 [26].
To provide some additional informations, in Tab. 1
we report the global clustering coefficients and mean
distances among the nodes for the above real net-
works, and a comparison with the same quantities
computed for random networks.
For BA and WS models, we consider 50 differ-
ent realizations for each network and perform 105
Monte Carlo runs with different initial conditions
for each of them. For the BA variants, we consider
20 different realizations of each graph and average
104 runs for each one. Finally, for real networks
the statistics varies from 104 and 105 runs, depend-
ing on their size. With such a choice, we keep the
statistical error on the final recovered density 〈dR〉
under control (for instance, it is of the order of 0.1%
in theoretical models).7 In all cases, we fix the re-
covering probability to pSIR = 0.1 and consider two
epidemic thresholds f = 0.05 or f = 0.15.8
3http://www3.nd.edu/~networks/resources/
metabolic/
4http://snap.stanford.edu/data/ca-HepTh.html
5http://snap.stanford.edu/data/p2p-Gnutella08.
html
6http://www3.nd.edu/~networks/resources/protein/
bo.dat.gz
7Statistical fluctuations are mainly determined by the sim-
ulation length, i.e. by the number of MC steps, while the
dependence on the particular network realization is rather
weak due to self-averaging.
8By comparison, in a regular square lattice the epidemic
4 Results
In this section, we report the main results of our
Monte Carlo simulations. In particular, we com-
pare the various immunization strategies according
to their ability in reducing the epidemic prevalence
〈dR〉 by 50% and 75% (the horizontal dotted lines
in the plots) and in reaching the epidemic threshold
(red solid line in the plots).
Figure 2. The recovered mean final density 〈dR〉 as
a function of the mean fraction of vaccinated 〈dV 〉, for
BA[2] with N = 1000 nodes. The LMTI scheme is
compared to TI, AI and HR immunization strategies.
The horizontal red solid line is the epidemic threshold,
f = 0.05 (a), 0.15 (b), while the horizontal dotted lines
are 25% and 50% of the mean final density of recovered
without any vaccination.
Fig. 2 collects the results for BA[2] for the two
different epidemic thresholds. As it can be ex-
pected, degree-based schemes are the most efficient
in the pure BA setting. In particular, TI is the best
choice in reducing the epidemic prevalence 〈dR〉 by
50%. Our strategy (with the optimal choice β = 20
and γ = 10) performs very similarly at low 〈dV 〉
for both values of the epidemic threshold. How-
ever, if we want to reduce the prevalence to the
25%, a fast response to the outbreak is crucial, i.e.
f = 0.05. In this case, TI and LMTI are the most
indicated strategies as they requires a vaccinated
fraction around 10%. Moreover, LMTI can further
threshold is pc,SIR = 0.1765 [27], so pSIR = 0.1 would be
in the spreading phase. In this work, our main goal is a
comparison of the relative effectiveness of the various vacci-
nation strategies. A change in pSIR will surely affect the final
balance of the epidemic, but, from the point of view of the
comparison of the strategies, the dependence on pSIR is not
crucial. Provided that pSIR is low enough to give a spreading
epidemic, a change of the value of the recovering probabil-
ity results in an overall shift of all the curves, but does not
change the relative performances.
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Figure 3. The recovered mean final density 〈dR〉 as
a function of the mean fraction of vaccinated 〈dV 〉, for
WS[2] withN = 1000 nodes and the rewiring probability
θ = 0.1. The LMTI scheme is compared to TI, AI and
HR immunization strategies. The horizontal red solid
line is the epidemic threshold, f = 0.05 (a), 0.15 (b),
while the horizontal dotted lines are 25% and 50% of the
mean final density of recovered without any vaccination.
reduce the epidemic prevalence for lower 〈dV 〉 than
TI. On the other side, a late reaction to the epi-
demic (f = 0.15) causes the difficulty in controlling
the spreading, so a massive vaccination process is
needed. In fact, LMTI (which is the best choice in
this eventuality) requires the vaccination of at least
the 25% of the entire population. Instead, TI fails
for 〈dV 〉 < 0.4. A similar behaviour holds also in
the BA[3] case, so we cease to give more details on
this.
Figure 4. The recovered mean final density 〈dR〉 as
a function of the mean fraction of vaccinated 〈dV 〉, for
WS[2] withN = 1000 nodes and the rewiring probability
θ = 0.5. The LMTI scheme is compared to TI, AI and
HR immunization strategies. The horizontal red solid
line is the epidemic threshold, f = 0.05 (a), 0.15 (b),
while the horizontal dotted lines are 25% and 50% of the
mean final density of recovered without any vaccination.
In the WS setting, results are radically different,
see Fig. 3 for the WS[2] and θ = 0.1 case. Here, TI
immunization is a poor strategy when compared to
LMTI and HRI. This is a consequence of the absence
of nodes acting as hubs for the epidemic spreading.
Figure 5. The recovered mean final density 〈dR〉 as
a function of the mean fraction of vaccinated 〈dV 〉, for
randomly rewired BA[2] with N = 1000 nodes and
R=100 (a), 2000 (b) rewiring events. The LMTI scheme
is compared to TI immunization strategy. The horizon-
tal red solid line is the epidemic threshold f = 0.05, while
the horizontal dotted lines are 25% and 50% of the mean
final density of recovered without any vaccination.
Figure 6. The recovered mean final density 〈dR〉 as a
function of the mean fraction of vaccinated 〈dV 〉,for ran-
domly connected BA[2] with N = 5000 total nodes, m =
20 equally populated clusters and k = 100 (a), 2000 (b)
new links. The LMTI scheme is compared to TI immu-
nization strategy. The horizontal red solid line is the
epidemic threshold f = 0.05, while the horizontal dot-
ted lines are 25% and 50% of the mean final density of
recovered without any vaccination.
However, both LMTI and HRI allow to reduce the
prevalence by 50% for a very small number of vac-
cinations (〈dV 〉 . 0.05 for both values of the epi-
demic threshold). Most remarkably, our strategy
can reduce it to 25% for both values of the epidemic
threshold with a vaccinated fraction lower than 10%
of the entire population (for comparison, AI has
the same effect for 〈dV 〉 = 0.2 ÷ 0.4). Therefore,
a prompt reaction has the only effect of lowering
the vaccination coverage needed to reach the aim.
WS networks with different Q and θ present anal-
ogous features, with the only difference that HRI
dramatically worsens as the rewiring probability in-
creases, see Fig. 4. In both BA and WS cases, our
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strategy allows to reach the epidemic threshold and
to effectively stop the epidemic.
The importance of local terms in (2.1) can be
better appreciated in the BA variants. Figs. 5 and
6 collects the results for these models with the epi-
demic threshold f = 0.05. In this case, we compare
only TI and LMTI, the best performers in the orig-
inal BA setting.
For partially randomized BA[2] with R = 100,
the network keeps an approximate BA structure, so
the results are very similar to the pure case. As
the randomization increases, TI gradually becomes
inefficient (except for small 〈dV 〉 values), so it is con-
venient to vaccinate nodes near the epidemic front.
This is clear in the R = 2000 case.
Now, we consider randomly connected BAs with
an highly clustered structure (m = 20). If these
clusters are poorly connected (k = 100), TI and
LMTI gives approximately the same performances,
with the only difference that our scheme allows
to stop the epidemic with a much smaller vacci-
nated fraction (〈dV 〉 ∼ 0.10) than TI. For a much
larger number of connections between the clusters
(k = 2000), the situation radically changes. In fact,
the reduction of the prevalence by 50% is better ac-
complished with TI scheme. For LMTI, the increase
of local terms importance worsens the efficiency at
low 〈dV 〉, but drastically improves the performance
for a larger number of vaccinations.
This behaviour has a simple explanation. When
the networks or their clusters have an approximately
BA structure, nodes acting as hubs are still present.
Therefore, in this case it is convenient to vaccinated
nodes with higher degree. As the original structure
is lost (increasing the randomization or the number
of new links between the original clusters), the im-
portance of hubs in the epidemic spreading is dras-
tically downsized. Once that highest degree nodes
are immunized, it is better to give much more impor-
tance to individuals near the epidemic front. This
also explains the faster decaying of LMTI curves for
increasing β values.
Finally, in Fig. 7 we report the results for real
networks. In order to halve the epidemic prevalence,
we note again that TI and LMTI are the most indi-
cated strategies and their performances are almost
equivalent. In particular, TI performs slightly bet-
ter only in CA-HepTh-pruned and AA. However, if we
want to further reduce the epidemic prevalence up to
25%, LMTI is always the best choice. Moreover, it
allows to effectively stop the epidemics for a smaller
vaccinated fraction than TI. Remarkably, HRI is a
rather inefficient choice also in ProteinYeast and In-
ternet_AS networks, which show a great structural
resistance to the epidemics (even without any vacci-
nation, the average size of an infection is relatively
small). When compared to HRI, AI seems to be
stronger, but it is comparable in efficiency to TI and
LMTI only in p2p-Gnutella08, in which it is more dif-
ficult to control the epidemic spreading (without im-
munization, the average size of an infection is about
the 65% of the entire population). This feature can
be explained noting that this network is highly and
uniformly connected as it presents the highest mean
degree and lowest mean vertex eccentricity.
C ` CR `R
CA-HepTh-pruned 0.28 5.9 0.0007 5.4
p2p-Gnutella08 0.020 4.6 0.0010 4.8
AA 0. 4.4 0.0044 4.6
Internet_AS 0.0096 3.6 0.00039 6.6
ProteinYeast 0.079 6.8 0.0017 6.4
Table 1. We report the global clustering coefficient C
and the mean distance among the nodes ` for the five real
networks. The last two columns show, as comparison,
the same quantities computed for a random graph with
the same number of nodes and links.
5 Conclusions
In this work, we have proposed a new reactive im-
munization strategy based on a local modification
of the Targeted Immunization protocol. The aim
of the local term is to actively take into account
the presence of the epidemic outbreak and design
the reactive vaccination by exploiting the infection
itself as a probe of the complex network. Our pro-
posal fits in the framework of commonly very appre-
ciated techniques using local knowledge about com-
plex systems, see for instance the Hebbian learn-
ing rule [28] for an exemplary model for neural net-
works and [29] for a detailed analysis. By means
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Figure 7. The recovered mean final density 〈dR〉 as a
function of the mean fraction of vaccinated 〈dV 〉 for a set
of real networks (a-e). The LMTI scheme is compared
to TI immunization strategy. The horizontal red solid
line is the epidemic threshold f , while the horizontal
dotted lines are 25% and 50% of the mean final density
of recovered without any vaccination. For Internet_AS
(a), the horizontal dotted line is the 50% of the mean
final density of recovered without any vaccination.
of explicit simulations we have compared our im-
munization scheme with other immunization strate-
gies. We have shown that our protocol is a very
efficient choice in all the considered cases, allowing
to stop the epidemic with a relatively small vacci-
nated fraction. The addition of a local term sensing
the infection was motivated by a naive picture of the
infection diffusion valid for a regular network. Nev-
ertheless, it is relevant also on a broad set of complex
network totally far from being regular. We did not
find a way to predict a priori the best choice for the
parameters of our score. In a purely phenomenolog-
ical approach, the best free parameters are chosen
empirically by looking at the performance of our
scheme as β and γ are changed. Hopefully, a deeper
investigation or the application of our score in sim-
pler models could help to settle this issue.9
Several extensions of our work can be foreseen.
On the theoretical side, one can explore other classes
of ideal networks with good theoretical control, like
weighted or directed graphs. From the point of view
of applications, it could be important to apply our
scheme to actual specific diseases, e.g. Xylella fas-
tidiosa, TBC and Ebola outbreaks. This will require
a more realistic propagation model like the delayed
SIR considered in [30], and a detailed cost bene-
fit analysis taking into account the finite resources
available for a real vaccination programme, see for
instance [31]. Finally, we remark that our immu-
nization scheme is clearly information-demanding,
as it requires the full knowledge of the neighbor-
hood of each node and the pattern of the epidemic
at the vaccination time. This is rather unlikely in
real situations and another natural evolution of the
present work would be the study of an immuniza-
tion strategy accounting the possibility of partial or
corrupted information about the system.
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